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THE ZUMWALT-CLASS DESTROYER
A Technology “Bridge” Shaping the Navy after Next
George V. Galdorisi and Scott C. Truver

T

he U.S. Navy’s decision to truncate procurement of the original fleet of
thirty-two guided-missile destroyers of the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) class to
just three ships does not diminish the value of the program to the United States
as a technology bridge to the “Navy after Next.” Rarely has the Navy had such an
opportunity to do just what the Chief of Naval OperaCaptain Galdorisi, USN (Ret.), is director of the Corpotions (CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead, directed in
rate Strategy Group at SPAWAR Systems Center Paearly 2009: “To take advantage of the technologies, to
cific. During his thirty-year career as a naval aviator he
was commanding officer of Helicopter Antisubmarine
learn from them” and to prepare the Navy for the unSquadron Light (HSL) 43 (the Navy’s first operational
certain “hybrid warfare” strategic environment of the
LAMPS Mk III squadron), HSL-41, USS Cleveland
1
future. Testing, refining, and retesting these technol(LPD 7), and Amphibious Squadron 7. His last operational assignment was as chief of staff for Cruiserogies and systems in a major surface warship can acDestroyer Group 3. His most recent book is Leave No
celerate the Navy’s efforts to provide robust, flexible,
Man Behind: The Saga of Combat Search and Rescue
(2009).
and agile forces for tomorrow’s roles, missions, and
Dr. Truver is Director, National Security Programs, at
tasks. Indeed, the lead DDG 1000 offers the potential
Gryphon Technologies LC. Since 1972 he has particito leverage today’s technology investments so as to
pated in many studies and assessments for government
help shape the characteristics and capabilities of warand private industry, and he is the author, coauthor,
or editor of numerous papers and reports, several hunships yet to come.
dred articles, and four books. He assisted in the development of numerous Navy–Marine Corps strategy
papers, supported the interagency task force drafting
the U.S. President’s National Strategy for Maritime
Security (2005), and has done extensive work with the
U.S. Coast Guard related to Maritime Domain
Awareness, the National Fleet Policy, and future capabilities requirements. Dr. Truver is a member of the
editorial board of this journal.
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PERSPECTIVE
Ninety years ago, the British military strategist and inventor Major General J. F. C. Fuller understood that
“tools, or weapons, if only the right ones can be discovered, form 99 percent of victory. . . . Strategy, command,
leadership, courage, discipline, supply, organization and
all the moral and physical paraphernalia of war are
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nothing to a high superiority of weapons—at most they go to form the one percent
2
which makes the whole possible.”
Having the “right” tools or weapons, as described by Fuller, is important for
the United States and its allies and friends as they confront an ambiguous period
of both asymmetrical, low-technology warfare and the possibility of hightechnology warfare with China, a rejuvenated Russia, or other developing states.
However, the link between the invention of a new technology and its impact on
warfare is never a straight line. What has proved crucial has been the aggressiveness with which nations develop, test, improve, manufacture, and field these
technologies as weapons of war. In Global Trends 2025, the National Intelligence
Council addressed the importance of shepherding new technologies to the point
where they transition to the end users, noting, “The pace of technological inno3
vation will be key. Major technologies historically have had an ‘adoption lag.’”
As the pace of global technological change has accelerated, the United States
has been especially adept at inserting new technology to pace the threat. As
Bruce Berkowitz points out in The New Face of War, “Recent experience suggests that the right technology, used intelligently, makes sheer numbers irrelevant. The tipping point was the Gulf War in 1991. When the war was over, the
United States and its coalition partners had lost just 240 people. Iraq suffered
about 10,000 battle deaths, although no one will ever really be sure. The difference was that the Americans could see at night, drive through the featureless
desert without getting lost, and put a single smart bomb on target with a 90
4
percent probability.”
Continuous technological innovation, experimentation, and insertion will
have a significant impact on the future of warfare, particularly to address the
“unknown unknowns” regarding which future technologies will be needed for
America’s military decades hence. For example, the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Operating Environment 2008 addressed the issue of technological
uncertainty by describing the astounding changes that have taken place in just
the last quarter-century alone:
One might also note how much the economic and technological landscapes outside
of the military have changed. . . . On the technological side, the Internet existed only
in the Department of Defense; its economic and communications possibilities and
implications were not apparent. Cellular phones did not exist. Personal computers
were beginning to come into widespread use, but the reliability was terrible.
Microsoft was just emerging from Bill Gates’ garage, while Google existed only in the
wilder writings of science fiction writers. In other words, the revolution in information and communications technologies, taken for granted today, was largely unimaginable in 1983.5
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The U.S. Navy has a legacy of technology innovation and insertion, embracing both evolutionary and revolutionary changes, tempered by the understanding that a navy’s ability to carry out its missions effectively has often depended
6
on who inserts the best technology the fastest and most effectively. As Rear Admiral Jay Cohen, then Chief of Naval Research, noted in 2004, “The Navy/Marine Corps of today and tomorrow are and will remain critically enabled by the
7
power of science and technology put to work for our Sailors and Marines.”
In addition to formal research and development programs and the much less
formal experimentation along the waterfront, the Navy has at various times in
its history taken good advantage of in-service platforms to insert and develop a
“bundle” of technologies—many dependent on each other—to test breakthrough, leading-edge capabilities that have the potential to alter the face of naval warfare. For example, the first U.S. surface-to-air missile ships were the
eight-inch-gun cruisers Boston and Canberra, which were converted for the new
mission. Likewise, the submarines Barbero and Tunny were converted to launch
Regulus land-attack missiles, making them (as SSG 317 and SSG 282) the
world’s first operational missile submarines.
But unlike these examples, in which ships approaching the ends of their service lives have been converted to experiment with new missions, DDG 1000 provides the Navy an opportunity to take emerging technology to sea not in a “test
8
ship” but in a frontline, battle-force, major surface warship. In that regard, the
surface warfare community can build on the U.S. submarine force’s experience
with the USS Memphis (SSN 691). In 1989, Memphis was designated an experimental submarine to test a variety of technologies and systems, including advanced hull materials and structures, unmanned underwater vehicles, advanced
sonars, and bottom-profiler navigation systems. In 1994 the Navy assigned SSN
691 to Submarine Development Squadron 12. But all the while, Memphis remained an operational asset—in May 2006 deploying to support Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM—and was included in the active force structure.
Using a new design and not an older ship to “test out” a variety of new technologies provides the Navy opportunity for experimentation on a scale not previously possible. In announcing his decision to truncate the DDG 1000 program
at just three ships, CNO chose words that emphasized the importance of this
ship as a technology incubator: “That’s why I was more interested in truncating
than terminating, so we can get a couple of ships out and see what they can do . . .
9
see if the technologies we put on [DDG 1000] are going to pay off for us.”
LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY “BUNDLES”
The “bundle” of technologies embodied in DDG 1000—as well as future technologies that could easily find homes in this ship—represents some of the most
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cutting-edge and transformational technologies ever adapted for naval uses: the
Integrated Power System (IPS); integrated electric drive; a stealthy tumblehome
hull and integrated topside (InTop) superstructure design; the 155 mm Advanced Gun System (AGS); the Mark 57 Peripheral Vertical Launching System
(PVLS); the Dual-Band Radar (DBR), which includes an S-band Volume Search
Radar (VSR) and X-band AN/SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR); and a host
of other advances related to network-centric warfare, stealth, survivability, and
dramatically reduced manning levels.
While some have criticized the Navy for embedding too many technologies
into DDG 1000, this perceived “weakness” is actually a strength, one that makes
this ship a credible host platform for the technologies that will accelerate the
10
leap to the Navy after Next. As DDG 1000 technologies continue to be tested
and matured, the ship should serve as the Navy’s surface platform—remember
Memphis—to evolve other advanced technologies as well into new warships.
But though the technologies currently embodied in DDG 1000 are on the
cutting edge, it is the ship’s potential to host even-farther-future, potentially
“game changing,” technologies that makes Zumwalt important. The fifteenthousand-ton ship has a 10 percent growth margin, equating to some 1,500 tons
of potential increase that would enable the ship to host new sensors and weap11
ons as technologies evolve. Inserting such systems into DDG 1000 throughout
the next decades and then improving on them, based on their operational effectiveness and ability to deal with emerging threats, will define what the Navy will
look like—and how it can fight—in the future.
For example, as the Office of Naval Research has recognized, “Among the possibilities inherent in all-electric ships are the new weapons that become feasible
12
when virtually unlimited electric power is available on board.” Zumwalt’s advanced all-electric propulsion plant, generating seventy-eight megawatts of
power, allows such weapons as high-powered lasers and electromagnetic rail
guns to be used without significantly impacting the ship’s electronic surveillance and weapons control systems or speed, a critical operational factor, given
the high electrical demands of these on-the-horizon weapons.
Such weapons are classified under the general heading of “directed-energy
weapons” (DEW), and they include high-energy lasers, radio-frequency weapons (high-power microwaves or ultra-wideband weapons), and electromag13
netic rail guns. They are far from futuristic weapons that may or may not be
feasible; the Office of Naval Research is already developing (and working to
scale up the power of) free-electron lasers, chemical lasers and their associated
beam directors, radio-frequency weapons, and full-scale electromagnetic rail
14
guns capable of launching precision-guided projectiles at hypersonic speeds.
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Indeed, independent assessments outside government have concluded that
solid-state lasers “are capable of making unique and important contributions to
15
U.S. military effectiveness.” The CNO has also directed that his Strategic Studies Group focus its latest deliberations on the impact that hypersonic and directed weapons will generate on the future of naval operations in the 2020–25
time frame, noting that these weapons—both those employed by the U.S. Navy
and those of future opponents—have “the potential to profoundly influence fu16
ture maritime operations.”
Modern rail-gun technology has been under development since the early
1980s and is projected to be a reality in the next decade. Ranges greater than two
hundred nautical miles are envisioned, using GPS-guided projectiles traveling
at six times the speed of sound. The fact that rail guns do not require powders or
17
explosives could free magazine space for strike and other mission areas.
The potential impact of the electromagnetic rail gun on the support of forces
ashore likewise could be profound. The power supplied by an all-electric ship
like DDG 1000 is sufficient to fire up to twelve electromagnetic projectiles per
minute. A twenty-pound projectile could reach a target about three hundred
miles away in about six minutes. Initially traveling 8,200 feet per second and
striking its target at five thousand feet per second, that twenty-pound rail-gun
projectile will penetrate tens of feet of reinforced concrete through its kinetic
energy alone.
Directed-energy weapons could also become significant in terms of the way
the Navy after Next provides ship and task-force self-defense in the contested littoral. A nation seeking to challenge the United States for control of local seas will
probably turn to cruise missiles, because these offer a relatively economical
method for conducting sophisticated attacks with a reasonable probability of inflicting damage on enemy ships off a coastline. Used to defeat a cruise missile
threat, directed-energy weapons could serve both as high-resolution sensors,
adding to capabilities provided by other Navy intelligence and surveillance systems, and as weapons, exploiting the advantages provided by a networked
18
force.
Directed-energy systems provide several mechanisms for cruise missile engagement and destruction. These weapons give the defender a speed advantage
of roughly six orders of magnitude, reducing the “time of flight” required to
reach an approaching missile. In the two to five seconds required to deposit laser
energy on a target, a Mach 4 missile will travel only about 3.5 nautical miles;
laser energy could destroy the attacker sixteen to eighteen nautical miles from
the defending platform—more than twice the best distance attained with con19
ventional systems. Embarked on mobile Navy warships, DEW could become
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the weapons of choice for defeating cruise missiles launched at naval formations
or for shooting down ballistic missiles launched against naval or other forces.
Swarming attack boats pose another significant challenge to naval ships operating in littoral waters. The severe damage inflicted upon the USS Cole (DDG
67) by one small, explosive-laden boat remains fresh in the minds of Navy planners. Directed energy offers the potential to disrupt the sensors of an attacking
small craft at the maximum line of sight. Even when fast attacking boats are discernible as threats, engaging them in the vicinity of friendly or neutral forces re20
quires more precision than is typically available with explosive ordnance. The
rapid responsiveness of directed-energy weapons makes them particularly useful against high-speed patrol boats or surface-effect craft, which can effectively
outmaneuver conventional gun systems. The physical characteristics of directedenergy systems give the defender greater control over the effects generated than
21
does any conventional weapon. Directed-energy weapons like the solid-state laser and the high-power microwave are potentially superior to kinetic weapons
against swarming small boats—and the people who man them—for a number of
reasons, chief among them the ability to use these weapons in a graduated response mode, where these swarming boats can be warded off with a succession of
effects, from nonlethal warning “shots” to lethal, accurate fire.
The prospect afforded by directed-energy weapons could represent for the
Navy and Marine Corps a potential paradigm shift in how the two services—as
well as the joint force—will conduct operations on and from the sea in the
twenty-first century. As the only feasible host platform for directed-energy
weapons for at least the next decade, DDG 1000 is the ship that will help pull
these technologies out of various laboratories and ground test sites and get them
deployed to sea, where they could revolutionize warfare at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
Hosting these directed-energy technologies on DDG 1000 offers the promise
of accelerating the development and refinement of these weapons in the operational environment. So doing will not only identify “the art of the possible” as to
what the Navy after Next can look like but also help determine if these technologies can deliver even a portion of their enormous potential. Directed-energy
weapons could be most useful in a future missile-defense role. They might be
able to target ballistic missiles in all phases of their trajectories—launch, boost
phase, and flight—thus helping to restore the odds for the defender. The long
range of directed-energy systems and their ability to target the sensitive sensor
and guidance systems of ballistic missiles make them particularly useful. If only
some of the full range of potential applications of directed-energy systems
proves effective, DDG 1000 will still have ably served as the prototype for the
22
high end of any “future surface combatant” family of ships.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss3/5
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THE TECHNOLOGY “BRIDGE”
U.S. military forces will have to operate and fight in a strategic environment
comprising a wide array of threats across the spectrum of violence, some of
which can only be imagined in 2010. Dealing with such a range of threats requires that the United States avoid the technological surprise that will enable an
enemy to exploit military weaknesses and deliver an asymmetric blow that will
thwart what this nation seeks to achieve at the strategic, operational, or tactical
level. A former Vice Chief of Naval Research, Brigadier General Thomas
Waldhauser, U.S. Marine Corps, put this imperative in focus: “Given the current
national security challenges our nation faces and those we expect to face in the
future, we must keep our focus forward and push innovative technological solu23
tions to address those future threats.”
But “pushing” those technologies out to the fleet and Fleet Marine Forces is
fraught with organizational and systemic challenges. “Transitioning” is an issue
of such concern that the Department of Defense asked the National Research
Council (NRC) to investigate the issues surrounding technology transition failures and the concomitant impact on the war fighter and to offer recommendations. The NRC provided a robust list of recommendations, but the title of its
final report—Accelerating Technology Transition: Bridging the Valley of Death for
Materials and Processes in Defense Systems—is a telling indicator of how difficult
this prospect remains. Significantly, the NRC concluded, “The adoption and acceptance of a new technology likely depends on the real or perceived impact of
24
that technology on high-level military goals.”
The DDG 1000 program could overcome many of these transition challenges,
primarily because the ship represents an ideal platform for hosting still-emerging
technologies. For example, insertion of DEW technologies into DDG 1000 to
support future war-fighting requirements promises an orderly, evolutionary,
block-upgrade process, and it is consistent with the Defense Department’s emphasis on acquisition reform and with the Navy’s desire to exercise more stewardship over its own acquisition programs.
This future has clearly captured the attention of Congress. The fiscal year
2010 National Defense Authorization Act calls for the Navy to develop several
plans and road maps, particularly for naval surface fire support—“to address
any shortfalls between required naval surface fire support capability and the
plan of the Navy to provide that capability”—and a technology road map for
future surface combatants and fleet modernization—“a plan to incorporate
into surface combatants constructed after 2011, and into fleet modernization
programs, the technologies developed for the DDG-1000 and the DDG-51 and
CG-47 Aegis ships, including technologies and systems designed to achieve
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25

significant manpower savings.” DDG 1000 provides important capabilities for
these and other requirements.
When the first DDG 1000 is delivered in 2013, the Navy should already have a
well developed technology-insertion and experimentation plan in place, if it is
to take advantage of this ship’s tremendous capabilities. In doing so, the Navy
will be able to leverage this ship fully and thereby accelerate the transformation
of tomorrow’s fleet into the Navy well after Next.

NOTES

1. “Momentum for Building DDG-51’s Remains, despite Young’s Objection,” Inside the
Pentagon, 12 February 2009.
2. Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History 1500 to Today
(New York: Gotham Books, 2006).
3. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World
(Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence
Council, November 2008), p. viii, available at
www.dni.gov.nic/.
4. Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How
War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century (New
York: Free Press, 2003), pp. 2–3. Berkowitz
does not restrict his examples to just one conflict, noting further, “The same thing happened when the United States fought
Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan in 2001. Each time experts feared
the worst; each time U.S. forces won a lopsided victory.”
5. Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges
and Implications for the Future Joint Force
(Suffolk, Va.: U.S. Joint Forces Command,
2008), available at us.jfcom.mil/. This publication, commonly referred to as “The JOE,”
serves as the “problem statement” regarding
what challenges the U.S. military and its coalition partners will face in the future and
informs all subsidiary joint publications, beginning with the Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations.
6. Boot, War Made New, pp. 1–473. Boot does
not present technology as the only element
determining victory or defeat, giving full acknowledgment to a host of other factors—
from geography to demography, to economics, to culture, to leadership. However, he is

firm in his contention of technology’s huge
impact, noting, “Some analysts may discount
the importance of technology in determining
the outcome of battles, but there is no denying the central importance of advanced weaponry in the rise of the West. . . . The way to
gain military advantage, therefore, is not necessarily to be the first to produce a new tool
or weapon. Often it is to figure out better
than anyone else how to utilize a widely available tool or weapon.”
7. Science and Technology for the 21st Century
Warfighter (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Research [ONR], 2004).
8. While some have questioned whether DDG
1000 will deploy, the CNO has been unambiguous in stating this ship will be a deployed
asset. See, for example, Geoff Fein,
“DDG-1000 Will Deploy, CNO Says,” Defense Daily, 28 April 2009.
9. Ibid.
10. See, for example, Ronald O’Rourke, Navy
DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress RL32109 (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 23 December 2009), available at www.fas.org/; and
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Zumwalt-Class Destroyer
Program Emblematic of Challenges Facing
Navy Shipbuilding, Statement of Paul Francis,
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Testimony before the Subcommittee
on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, GAO-08-1061T (Washington, D.C.: 31 July 2008). This GAO report addresses the challenges of embedding so many
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technologies in one ship, noting, “Rather than
introducing three or four new technologies (as
is the case on previous surface combatants),
DDG 1000 plans to use a revolutionary hull
form and employ 11 cutting-edge technologies, including an array of weapons, highly
capable sensors integrated into the sides of a
deckhouse made primarily of composite material—not steel, and a power system designed for advanced propulsion as well as
high-powered combat systems and ship service loads. This level of sophistication has necessitated a large software development
effort—14 million to 16 million lines of
code.”
11. O’Rourke, Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs. See also National Defense
Business Institute, The U.S. Navy’s Destroyer
Acquisition Plan: Examining Options for Acquiring DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyers to
Meet Maritime Capability Requirements
(Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee, 2009). This
study noted the large growth potential of
DDG 1000.
12. Science and Technology for the 21st Century
Warfighter, p. 25.
13. George Galdorisi and Lynn Pullen, Leveraging
Directed-Energy Weapons to Accelerate Naval
Transformation: Prospects and Issues
(Arlington, Va.: Center for Security Strategies
and Operations, December 2004), p. 15.
14. Science and Technology for the 21st Century
Warfighter, pp. 25–26. See also Galdorisi and
Pullen, Leveraging Directed-Energy Weapons
to Accelerate Naval Transformation; and William McCarthy, Directed Energy and Fleet
Defense: Implications for Naval Warfare
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air War College Press, May 2000). The fact that directedenergy weapons have not been written about
extensively in the defense media over the past
several years can be traced directly to the uncertainties surrounding DDG 1000
Zumwalt-class program. Without a “host”
platform having an integrated power system
and integrated electric drive, directed-energy
weapons will remain land-bound.
15. Thomas Ehrhard, Andrew Krepinevich, and
Barry Watts, “Near-Term Prospects for Battlefield Directed-Energy Weapons,” CSBA
Backgrounder (January 2009), available at
www.CSBAonline.org. The authors note,
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among other findings, that “lasers have long
been considered a technology that could give
rise to a new [revolution in military affairs].
As a December 2007 Defense Science Board
on directed-energy weapons (DEW) observed, lasers promise to be a transformational ‘game changer’ in military operations.
Recent advances in solid-state laser (SSL)
technologies suggest, however, that directedenergy weapons in the 100-kilowatt (kW)
range with power sources dense enough to
provide ‘deep’ magazines could be fielded in
the near future. . . . In sum, the technical
challenges that have long delayed the fielding
of directed-energy weapons for battlefield use
finally appear to be giving way to technical
and engineering progress.” See also Andrew
Krepinevich, Tom Ehrhard, and Barry Watts,
“Solid-State Laser Weapon Systems: Bridging
the Gap—or a Bridge Too Far?” Center for
Strategic & Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)
briefing, 20 May 2009. The briefers, all highly
respected defense experts who authored the
study cited here, conclude that the key impediments to the development of solid-state
lasers are not technical but cultural and
institutional.
16. Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum for
Director, Strategic Studies Group, 23 September 2009.
17. H. G. Ulrich and Mark Edwards, “The Next
Revolution at Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 2003). See also Scott
Truver, “Naval Warfare at the Speed of
Light,” Jane’s Navy International (July/August
2003), p. 27.
18. Andrew Koch, “Sea Power 21 to Change Face
of US Navy,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 19 June
2002.
19. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Directed
Energy Volume, New World Vistas: Air and
Space Power for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: 18 June 1996), p. 67.
20. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force
on High Energy Laser Weapon System Applications (Washington, D.C.: Defense Science
Board, Department of Defense, June 2001), p.
86.
21. McCarthy, Directed Energy and Fleet Defense,
p. 27. See also Claude Berube, “The Post Oceanic Navy, the New Shadow Zones, and the
U.S. Navy’s Force Structure Challenge,”
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Small Wars Journal, 16 April 2009, www
.smallwarsjournal.com.
22. Science and Technology for the 21st Century
Warfighter, p. 25. This now-five-year-old
ONR report was prescient in recognizing the
potential of the DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer as the lead ship for the Navy after
Next, noting, “IPS and electric drive will revolutionize surface ship and submarine
warfighting capabilities by increasing combat
effectiveness and agility while reducing ownership costs, space requirements, vulnerability, and crew size. Indeed, IPS is critical to the
future development of the ‘all-electric
Navy.’”
23. Ibid., p. 2.
24. The National Research Council is a part of
the National Academies consortium,

comprising the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering,
the Institute of Medicine, and the National
Research Council. This report, Accelerating
Technology Transition: Bridging the Valley of
Death for Materials and Processes in Defense
Systems (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2004), available at www.nap.edu,
notes, “Accelerating the transition of new
technologies into defense systems will be crucial to achieving military transformation. . . .
Historical precedents for the transition of
new technologies into defense systems have
been neither fast nor efficient.”
25. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, U.S. Statutes at
Large 123 (2009): 2190, sec. 125, Procurement Programs for Future Naval Surface
Combatants.
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